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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies 
(CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long-term 
output by about 17 percent. The effect is more important in smaller countries, with relative higher dependence on 
external financing, and in which the banking sector noticed more important financial disequilibria. We also 
found that fiscal policy measures have been the most efficient tools in dealing with the crises, while the role of 
monetary policy instruments has been rather blinded. Exchange rate resulted to be more a propagator than a 
crises absorber, while the IMF credit has been found to have positive (but not significant) impact on growth 
performance. Finally, the effect for the CEECs is much bigger than in the EU advanced economies, for which we 
found that financial crises lowers long-term output only by 2 percent. 
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1. Introduction  
The current financial crisis that started to spread over the world in 2007 has led to a 
rapid and sharp deterioration of economic activity. The severity of this impact has brought 
once again the discussion about the real economic effects of financial crises. In the literature, 
only few studies report no or modest permanent impacts of financial crisis on economic 
output2 (Hutchison, 2001; Boyd et al., 2005) and in general these findings concern developed 
economies under minor crises. Traditionally, financial crises are associated with severe 
economic downturns (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  
 The propagation channels of financial crises on the real economy pass from a sharp 
currency depreciation through wealth effects and aggregate demand, through increasing 
imported factors prices and production costs. Financial crises affect also private agents’ 
behavior, increasing uncertainty about future gains and decreasing the level of investment and 
consumption. Other important channels of crises propagation work through the banking 
system by disturbing the process of credit intermediation, and in the payment system by 
decreasing collateral values. 3 
These real effects seem to be more important and persistent in emerging countries. In 
fact, developing economies are more vulnerable to the factors that lead to crises, such as: 
banks and private agents exposure to currency and maturity mismatch, disruption in 
international capital markets, banks panic (Chang and Velasco, 1998) and “sudden stops” in 
capital inflows (Calvo, 2006). The empirical findings in the literature corroborate this thesis 
 
2 Some traditional views on the real effect of (currency) crises suggest that, under the existence of nominal 
rigidities, the real depreciation increases exportations and stimulates employment and output. For example, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006) find a positive impact in the case of 40 percent of the currency crises taken under 
consideration.  
3 See for example the “Financial accelerator theory” in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997).  


and suggest that the effect of financial crises on economic activity in developing countries is 
bigger and more persistent than in developed economies.4 
In this context, the European transition economies (CEECs hereafter) constitute a very 
interesting group of countries. Indeed, despite increasing similarities to developed economies 
they still show important features of emerging markets. In addition, structural reforms, which 
could enhance the degree of resilience in these economies, are far to be completed making 
thus more likely that the effect of financial crises would be important and persistent.  
The main objective of this work is to analyze the effect of financial crises on real output 
for 11 CEECs’ economies. In doing so, we follow the methodology initiated by Romer and 
Romer (1989) to assess the impact of monetary shock on output. More precisely we estimate 
an autoregressive with distributed lags (ADRL) equation of financial crises and output 
growth, and we derive the corresponding impulse response functions for real output. This 
method completes previous attempts to measure the output cost of the crises assessing their 
short- and long-term impact. In fact, traditional approaches (initiated by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) consist of output regressions including several 
controls, contemporaneous and lagged variables (real growth, real GDP per capital) and 
financial crises in a panel of developed and emerging economies.5 Cerra and Sexana (2008) 
were the first, to our knowledge, to add impulse response functions to distinguish between the 
short-term and the long-term impact of currency and banking crisis on real GDP. The same 
methodology was used by Furceri and Mourougane (2009) to assess the impact of financial 
 
For example, Hutchison and Ilan (2005) analyzing the impact of currency and banking crises for a large set of 
countries find that while in a sample of 24 emerging economies real output contraction reaches 8 percent and last 
2 years, when developed countries are included in the study the reduction in output is about 2 percent during 
only one year.  Similarly, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) find that the real effect of banking crises is about 1.5 
percentage point bigger for developing countries. Moreover, the recent  Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) historical 
analysis underlines that a decline in real GDP is greater and more persistent for emerging than developed 
countries.  
5 See, for example, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Barro, 2001; Bordo et al., 2001; Hutchison, 2001; Huichison 
and Ilan, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006. 

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crises on potential output for a panel of 30 OECD economies, and more recently by the 
European Commission to assess the potential output and potential growth effect of financial 
crises (European Commission, 2009). 
Our approach completes and improves exiting studies by: 
1. Using two different methodologies to identify financial crises. First, we construct a 
market pressure index (MPI) that takes into account the pressure in the real exchange rate and 
in foreign exchange reserves, and which accounts for several financial (mostly currency)  
crises. Second, we use the recent IMF crises database (Leaven and Valencia, 2008) to 
construct a dummy in correspondence of financial (banking, debt and currency) crises. 
Finally, given the importance of the ongoing financial crisis for the CEEC economies, we 
include it to both indexes as starting in 2007. 
2. Comparing the real effects of financial crises between the CEEC economies and 
advanced European countries (EU-15 hereafter). 
3. Controlling for structural heterogeneity and the role of macroeconomic policy 
response.  
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methodological 
and data issues. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.  
2. Methodology and Data 
To assess the impact and persistence of financial crises occurrence on output we follow 
the methodology proposed by Romer and Romer (1989).  In particular, the approach consists 
of estimating and ADRL (4, 4) equation and to derive the relative impulse response functions:  
      


where y is output, D is a dummy variable, which takes value equal to one in case of a financial 
crisis occurrence and zero otherwise,  are country fixed effects to control for unobservable 
countries specific characteristics and  is the error term. The numbers of lags has been 
tested, and the results suggest that the inclusion up to 4 lags produces the best specification. 
We correct for heteroskedasticity, when this is the cases, using White robust standard errors, 
while the problem of autocorrelation related to our dependent variable is solved using their 
lags as explanatory variables. 
   The impulse response functions (IRFs) are obtained by simulating a one year crisis 
and by computing the response of output over time trough the estimated coefficients. In 
particular, the simultaneous response will be , the one-ahead cumulative response will be    , and so on. Then, 95-percent level confidence bands are derived using 
Monte-Carlo simulations using one thousand of trials.  
Since we are also interested in the role of structural and macroeconomic policy 
variables on growth performance during times of crises, we re-estimate equation (1) adding 
interactions terms between the above-mentioned variables, crises occurrence and lagged 
output growth.  The expanded specification is then: 
            
where  stands for structural or macroeconomic policy variables,  and  capture, 
respectively, the effects of on output persistence and on the direct impact of financial 
crises on output. The parameter  captures the impact of control variables on output. In all, 
the simultaneous impact of the crisis on output as measured by the impulse response functions 
will be   , the one-ahead cumulative response will be          and so on. 


To deal with the endogeneity issue, since some control variables can be affected by the 
crisis occurrence, we often consider their lagged values.  In addition, to capture the impact of 
some macroeconomic policy measures, such as changes in government spending or in interest 
rate, we focus on their value after the crises onset.  
All data are taken from the IMF International Statistics and World Economic Outlook 
database, except for government spending and central banks interest (REFI) rates that come 
from OECD Economic Outlook 85 (2009) and central banks statistics. The dataset consist of 
an unbalanced panel of annual observations from 1989 to 2008 for 11 CEECs’ economies 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).6 
Financial crises episodes are identified using two approaches.7 The first is based on the 
work by Valencia and Leaven (2008), which list financial crises (currency, debt and banking 
crises) for all the countries in our sample from 1970 to 2007. The current financial crisis is 
assumed to have taken place in 2007. The second approach is the market pressure index 
(MPI). Since currency crises are usually associated with severe pressure on the domestic 
currency, we follow the approach used by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and we adopt a criterion for 
the definition of a crisis that accounts for both pressures occurring in the real effective 
exchange rate market (REER) and diminishing official foreign exchange (FX) reserves.8 In 
particular, the crisis occurs when the indicator is standard deviations above its mean. We 
 
6 The EU-15 countries included in the analysis as comparison are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.
See Table1 for a detailed description of crises episodes.
The reason that we use the real exchange rate – rather than the nominal one - is that it gives a more realistic 
view of crises episodes in the CEECs economies since these countries have adopted many different exchange 
rate regimes since the beginning of their transition process. We use REER and official FX reserves quarterly data 
from the IMF database.  Credit boom episodes are identified on the basis of excessive banking credit growth 
comparing to a country financial sector and economic development (Zdzienicka, 2008).


adopt a grid-search methodology which consists of seeking a value of   in the interval [0, 3]9 
which best reproduces the historical crises of the countries under exam. Using this 
methodology, we find that the value of 1.5 correctly identifies major crises in CEECs.10 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Baseline  
Basic Results 
We start by estimating equation (1) using both the MPI index and the IMF financial 
crisis dummy. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2. Looking at the table 
we can see that both financial crises dummies have a significant contemporaneous effect on 
growth. Moreover, while in the case of the MPI index the first and the third lags are 
statistically significant, in the case of the IMF dummy all lags are statistically significant. 
These results, together with the significant persistence of output growth, imply that the 
occurrence of a financial crisis may have long lasting effects on output. This is confirmed by 
the impulse response functions derived by the estimated coefficients presented in the table. In 
particular, when our MPI is applied (Figure 1a), a financial crisis lowers output by 14 percent 
in the long-run. The impact is even greater with the IMF crisis indicator, for which the 
cumulative output loss is close to 18 percent (Figure 1b). This is consistent with the finding 
that the impact of banking and twin (currency and banking) crises on output is bigger than the 
one of currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Cerra and 
Saxena, 2008).  
Robustness check and endogeneity test 
 To check for the robustness of our results, we replicate this empirical exercise 
including other time shocks (time dummies) and oil shocks (oil price). The results even in this 
 
9 The conventional choice of  is between 2.5 and 3 (Edison, 2003).  
10 Using the same method, we set the value  at 2 for the EU-15 countries. 


case are statistically significant and suggest that the financial crises have permanent effects on 
output. In detail, we find that, even if the impact of other shocks has a significant effect on 
annual growth, financial crises continue to have a negative short and long-term impact on 
output. The cumulative lost is however lower and accounts for 8 percent in the case of the 
MPI (Figure 2a) and 15 percent in the case of the IMF indicator (Figure 2b).  
 Subsequently, we control for the endogeneity of financial crises dummies. In fact, it is 
possible that economic slowdowns lead to crises onset, and in that case our OLS estimation 
will be biased and inconsistent. However, the GMM estimations using the MPI (Figure 3a) 
and IMF index (Figure 3b) report an almost identical impact than that obtained with the OLS 
method. As additional test, the Probit estimates of the probability of a crisis as a function of 
past growth performance and previous financial crises corroborates the absence of 
endogeneity bias (Table 3).11  
Are financial crises more pernicious in the EU transition economies?  
 We test whether CEEC countries are more resilient to financial crises than other EU 
countries. To this purpose we estimate equation (1) for the EU-15 for the period 1980-2008. 
When we compare the results between CEEC and EU-15 countries, we can see that impulse 
functions show a bigger and more persistent effect in the case of the CEECs’ economies. 
More precisely, with the MPI (Figure 4a) the short-term effect of financial crisis on the EU-15 
output is negligible while in the CEECs output decreases by 2 percent. The long-term crisis 
impact in the EU-15 is greater than the one in the short-run (almost 3 percent of cumulative 
loss), but still much less important than in the CEECs – 12 percent. The estimates based on 
the IMF indicator (Figure 4b) confirm the significance of both short and long-term effects of 
financial crisis. However, while the short-term effect is less important in the CEECs, the 
 
11 The endogeneity and omitted variables test carried out for the actual EMU members confirms the 
predominance impact of financial crisis on growth rate and the validity of the exogeneity assumption. Results are 
available from the authors upon request.  


crises impact on output is more visible in the EU-15 (1 percent loss). In the long -term, output 
in the EU-15 countries recovers and the cumulative loss stabilizes at 2 percent.  
 In all, the output loss associated to financial crises in the EU-15 countries is about 1-2 
percent in the short-term. In the long-term, the crisis impact on the CEECs is much more 
important and persistent than in the EU-15 countries. These results are in line with previous 
findings. For example, according to European Commission, the European countries growth 
rate will be reduced by a half in the short-term. In the long-term, the impact on potential 
growth is supposed to be more persistent in the case of CEECs.  In fact, given the crisis 
implications on the growth components (investment, structural unemployment, factors 
productivity), the long-term reduction in growth rate is expected to reach 3.8 percent in the 
EMU countries and almost 7 percent in CEECs.   
3.2. Macroeconomic Features and Policy Variables  
So far, we have studied how financial crises affect the output performance in the 
CEECs’ economies.  Now, we attempt to determine whether countries’ structural 
heterogeneity and macroeconomic policy variables play a role in shaping the impact of 
financial crises. More precisely, we explore the role of country size, openness, dependence on 
external financing, current account disequilibria, FDI inflows, financial development, credit 
boom, and a set of macroeconomic policy variables (exchange rate regime, government 
spending, monetary policy rates, and IMF aid). 12 
Size and Openness 
First, we examine whether the size of the economy and its openness affect the impact 
and persistence of financial crises on output growth. It is reasonable to think that smaller 
economies are more exposed to external shocks (Aghion et al., 1999), since they are less 
 
12 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics concerning these variables.   


diversified and face resources constraints. It is also reasonable to assume that in economies 
with a higher degree of trade openness, that are per se more exposed to external shocks 
(Rodrick, 1998), the impact of financial crises may be more important. However, while our 
results indicated that the impact of financial crises decrease with the size of the economy 
(Table 5), trade openness (measured as the GDP share of total exports and imports) is found 
to be not statically significant (Table 5). This “puzzling” findings for trade openness is also 
reported by other studies (Cerra et al., 2009), and may be partially explained by the reduced 
effect of fiscal stimulus in open economies.  
When we analyze the effect of the crises controlling for the size of the economy the 
impact is lower for the countries in which the size exceeds the sample median. More 
precisely, with the MPI index (Figure 5a) the short-term and long-term effects of financial 
crises on output are respectively about 1 and 9.5 percent for the bigger countries, while for the 
smaller ones these losses are respectively about 2 and 10.5 percent. The estimates based on 
the IMF dummy (Figure 5b) produce similar results in the short-run, but the long-term impact 
is even more important (14 percent) for smaller countries.  
External Financing 
Subsequently, we explore the CEECs’ heterogeneity in terms of dependence on 
external financing. From a theoretical point of view, we should expect that the more the 
country depends on external sources in financing its activities the larger will be the effect of 
financial crises on its growth performance. Indeed, countries relying hardly on external 
financing have private sector balance sheets more exposed and are more vulnerable to sudden 
reversals in foreign capital flows. Our results (Table 5) confirm this theory and corroborate 
previous findings (Braun and Larrain, 2003; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2004; Tong and Wei, 2009). 
In details, in countries with a higher external financing (the 4th quartile of the foreign banks 


liabilities’ dependent distribution), the impact of financial crises on output is at least twice 
more important than for the countries with average dependence on external financing. In all, a 
cumulative output loss varies between over 20 (the IMF dummy; Figure 6b) and 90 (The MPI; 
Figure 6a) percent for the most exposed CEECs. 
Current Account Disequilibria and FDI 
Dependence on external financing is closely associated with current account 
disequilibria. In fact, we notice that an increase in the current account deficit in the pre-crisis 
period amplifies the crises impact. More precisely, the crisis occurrence decreases output 
about 1 percent in the short-term and 9 percent in the long-run (the MPI; Figure 7). However, 
albeit our results stay in line with those reported by the literature (Bordo et al., 2001), the 
impact of growing current account deficit on growth performance seems to be less important 
and uncertain. Indeed, the difference in output contraction between the countries that noted 
one-percent point increase and those that noted similar decrease in current account deficit 
before the crisis onset is less than 0.5 percent. Moreover, with the IMF dummy, the impact of 
current account disequilibria is not significant (Table 6). This is partially due to the fact that 
the CEECs’ current account deficit has been largely financed by foreign direct investments 
that are considered as more stable especially in times of crises (Lipsey, 2001; World Bank 
2009). Actually, when we look at the crises impact on growth performance controlling for the 
change in FDI inflows before the crisis occurrence, we notice that the short-term effect of the 
crises is less important in the countries that observed an increase of FDI inflows above the 
sample median.13 However, when the FDI inflows decrease the impact of financial crises on 
output is about 1.5 percent when the MPI is considered (Figure 8a). The opposite can be seen 
when we include the IMF dummy (Figure 8b).  
 
13  See also Table 9. 


Financial Development and Credit Boom 
We also examine how financial development affects the impact of the crises on the 
real economy. A priori, the influence of financial development on growth performance during 
the times of crises is uncertain. On the one hand, financial development has a positive impact 
on economic growth through saving and investment channels (Levine, 1997). On the other 
hand, financial development can increase financial instability leading to unsustainable credit 
expansion, deterioration of borrower capacity and balance sheets disequilibria, and thus 
deteriorates economic growth (Bordo et al., 2001). In this context, previous works found a 
short-term detrimental effect and a long-term positive impact of financial development on 
growth performance (Loayza and Rancière, 2005). When we look at financial development in 
the EU transition economies, we remark that the real impact of financial crises is much more 
important for the countries with financial development above the sample median.14 More 
precisely, with the MPI (Figure 9a) and the IMF dummy (Figure 9b) the short-term negative 
effect of financial crises on output is about 2.5 percent for whole sample while the long-term 
impact for the countries with the highest financial depth (the 4th quintile of the banking credit-
to-GDP distribution) is respectively 10 and 15 percent more important. These findings can be 
partially explained by the fact that financial development in some CEECs’ transition 
economies can be “excessive” and “unsustainable” comparing to their economic development. 
As matter of fact, when we test for credit boom, we can observe that the countries that have 
been characterized by “excessive” banking credit development are more heavily affected by 
financial crises (Table 6). In detail, for the countries with sustainable credit growth, the short-
term impact of financial crises is marginal (the MPI; Figure 10a) or lower than one percent 
(the IMF; Figure 10b), while the long-term output cumulative loss is respectively 11 and 12.5 
percent. For the countries that experienced credit boom in the times of crises, the short- term 
 
14 See also Table 10. 


effect is respectively 4 and 10 percent, and in the long-run output performance deteriorates 
about 18 and 28 percent.  
Macroeconomic Policy Variables 
So far, we have focused on the CEECs’ structural heterogeneity in explaining the 
impact of financial crises on output, but macroeconomic policy variables can influence the 
impact and persistence of financial crises. Here, we examine the effect of the following 
variables: exchange rate regime, changes in government spending and in central bank policy 
rates, and foreign aid approximated by the International Monetary Fund credits and loans.  
Firstly, we analyze the impact of exchange rate regime on growth performance after 
the crisis onset. Traditionally, the flexible exchange rate regimes are reported to perform 
better during financial crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Goldstein et al. 2000, Cerra et 
al., 2009). Indeed, it is reasonable to think that under flexible exchange rate regime the 
monetary authorities are less financially constrained and dispose of at least one more policy 
instrument to deal with the crisis (Tong and Wei, 2009). Our results reported in Table 7 
partially confirm these findings. However, while flexible exchange rate attenuates the impact 
of crises as measured by the MPI, fixed exchange rate regimes perform better under financial 
crises detected by the IMF dummy. More precisely, with the MPI (Figure 11a) flexible 
exchange rate decreases the impact of the crises on output about 1.5 percent in the short-term 
and over 2 percents in the long-run. The estimates based on the IMF dummy (Figure 11b) 
report a marginal impact of financial crises on output in the short-term, but thecumulative 
output loss is over 4-percents less important when a country operates under fixed exchange 
rate. We can find two possible explanations for this finding. On the one side, a fixed exchange 
rate regime was adopted successively in CEECs at the beginning of their transition period as a 
part of stabilization programs and with the aim to gain the foreign investors trust. On the other 


side, fixed exchange regime, by eliminating currency risk, attenuates the financial 
vulnerabilities linked to the CEECs’ dependence on external financing.   
When we look at the fiscal policy variable in transition economies, we notice a 
positive and significant effect of government spending increase on growth performance 
(Table7).15 More precisely, with the IMF dummy (Figure 12b), the short-term effect of 
financial crises is marginal for the countries where the change in government spending is 
above the sample median and the long-term impact is 2- percents less important than for the 
countries with no change in government spending. When we use the MPI methodology 
(Figure 12a), the effect of fiscal stimulus is more delayed in the time, but the long-term 
impact of government spending is as much as important.  
 In the case of monetary policy, the effect on growth performance during periods of 
crises is less obvious, especially for developing economies. On the one hand, there is not 
unique recommendation concerning the monetary authorities’ actions. Some economists 
advocate in favor of the interest rate increase to defend the currency and attract foreign 
capitals back into the country, while others encourage the opposite action to stimulate the 
economy (Krugman, 1999; Christiano et al., 2002). On the other hand, the impact of monetary 
stimulus on growth performance also remains uncertain. More precisely, while a positive 
impact is reported for industrialized economies, for developing countries the monetary policy 
have only weak influence on economic growth (Romer and Romer, 1989; Cerra et al., 2009). 
For the CEEC economies we report a positive impact of changes in central bank interest rate 
on economic growth after the crisis onset (Table7). In details, with the MPI (Figure 13a) and 
IMF dummy (Figure13b), a decrease in interest rate starts to influence output only after the 5 
 
15Previous findings corroborate a positive impact of fiscal stimulus on growth recovery in developing and 
developed countries (Claessens et al., 2004; Cerra et al., 2009).
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periods and the impact of one percentage point decrease in interest rate accounts for less than 
0.5-percent increase in output.  
Finally, the last variable that we analyze is the IMF credit and loans. There is a large 
body of the literature debating about the impact of foreign aid on economic activity in times 
of crises. Some authors underline their positive impact on growth recovery (Eichengreen and 
Rose, 2003; Lee and Park, 2003), while others find no significant effect (Honoham and 
Klingebiel, 2003; Cerra et al. 2009). In the case of transition economies, the impact of foreign 
liquidity support is not significant (Table7). This can be partially due to the reticence of 
national authorities to ask about the foreign financial aid just after the onset of the crisis. The 
ongoing financial crisis seems to be the exception, but it is too early to assess effects of the 
recent IMF aid on the CEECs’ growth performance.  
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the short- and long-term impact of financial 
crises on output in the CEEC economies by estimating an autoregressive with distributed lags 
(ADRL) equation of financial crises and output growth and deriving the relative impulse 
response functions for real output. 
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
1) Financial crises have a significant impact on output both in the short and in the long-run. In 
particular, financial crises are found to lower output by 1 percent after one year, and by 17 
percent after 5 years. The impact of currency crises is relatively less important (12 percent).  
2) Comparing the effect of financial crises between the CEEC and the EU-15 economies, our 
results suggest that the effect is more important for the CEECs.  

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3) Controlling for structural heterogeneity among CEECs, the impact of financial crises is 
more important for smaller countries, with greater dependence on external financing, where 
the banking sector shows greater disequilibria (dominance of foreign sources of financing, 
excessive credit growth), and whose current account deficit is lower and less financed by the 
FDI inflows.  
4) The impact of financial crises on growth performance is mostly influenced by fiscal policy 
(in terms of increase in government spending), while the effect of monetary policy is rather 
limited. Exchange rate can amplify the real effect of financial crises on the CEECs’ 
economies. Moreover, the impact of foreign financial aid, albeit positive, has been found to be 
not significant. 
In lights of these findings, the claim that these countries could be better off in joining 
the EMU in the very short-term may be only partially true. In fact, on the one hand the 
monetary integration process could favor other reforms that would increase the resilience of 
these economies to external shocks (Duval, 2008). On the other hand, even if the principal 
role in crises absorption belongs to fiscal policy, the large worsening of public finances would 
make domestic monetary and exchange rate policy the only (independent) tool to face the 
current and future significant output loss.  
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Figure 1.The impact of financial crises on the CEECs’ output 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
Figure 2.The impact of financial crises controlling for other shocks 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
Figure 3.The impact of financial crises-GMM 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
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Figure 4.The impact of financial crises: CEECs vs. EU-15 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The impact of financial crises controlling for the size 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
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Figure 6.The impact of financial crises controlling for dependence on external financing  
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.The impact of financial crises controlling for changes in current account deficit in the 
pre-crisis period (MPI index). 
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Figure 8.The impact of financial crises controlling for FDI inflows in the pre-crisis period 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
 
 
 
Figure 9.The impact of financial crises controlling for the degree of financial deepening 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
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Figure 10. The impact of financial crises controlling for Credit Booms 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The impact of financial crises controlling for exchange rate regime 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
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Figure 12.The impact of financial crises controlling for changes in government spending 
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
  
 
 
 
Figure 13.The impact of financial crises controlling for changes in policy rate  
A. The MPI Index    B. The IMF crisis dummy 
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Table 1. Financial crises episodes. 
MPI IMF 
Bulgaria 1990 
Bulgaria 1994 1994 
Bulgaria 1996 1996 
Bulgaria 2007 2007 
Croatia 1998 1998 
Croatia 2007 2007 
Czech Rep 1996 1996 
Czech Rep 2007 2007 
Estonia 1992 1992 
Estonia 1998 
Estonia 2001 
Estonia 2007 2007 
Hungary 1991 1991 
Hungary 1997 
Hungary 2007 2007 
Latvia 1992 1992 
Latvia 1994 1995 
Latvia 2007 2007 
Lithuania 1992 1992 
Lithuania 1996 1995 
Lithuania 2007 2007 
Poland 1992 1992 
Poland 2000 
Poland 2007 2007 
Romania 1990 1990 
Romania 1996 1996 
Romania 2007 2007 
Slovakia 1999 1998 
Slovakia 2003 
Slovakia 2007 2007 
Slovenia 1992 1992 
Slovenia 2007 2007 
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Table 2.The effect of financial crises on output- OLS 
MPI  IMF  
Growth (-1) 0.476 
(4.26)*** 
0.329 
(4.68)*** 
Growth (-2) -0.255 
(-2.29)** 
-0.121 
(-1.70)* 
Growth (-3) 0.038 
(0.38) 
0.022 
(0.40) 
Growth (-4) -0.036 
(-0.48) 
-0.043 
(-1.10) 
Crisis -2.602 
(-2.92)*** 
-1.729 
(-3.26)*** 
Crisis (-1) -2.109 
(-2.10)** 
-5.621 
(-6.78)** 
Crisis (-2) -0.431 
(-0.47) 
-2.700 
(-3.85)*** 
Crisis (-3) -1.440 
(1.84)* 
-2.069 
(-3.19)*** 
Crisis (-4) 0.456 
(0.60) 
-1.453 
(-2.38)** 
N 156 156 
R2 0.73 0.63 
Note: t- statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3.The effect of past growth on the probability of financial crisis (Probit) 
MPI IMF 
Crisis (-1) -6.484 
(-0.00) 
-6.632 
(-0.00) 
Crisis (-2) -0.318 
(-0.58) 
-0.170 
(-0.27) 
Crisis (-3) -0.445 
(-0.00) 
-6.510 
(-0.00) 
Crisis (-4) -0.039 
(-0.09) 
-0.270 
(-0.44) 
Growth (-1) -0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.076 
(-1.20) 
Growth (-2) -0.006 
(-0.09) 
0.135 
(1.72) 
Growth (-3) 0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.056 
(-1.05) 
Growth (-4) 0.020 
(0.58) 
0.022 
(0.58) 
N 156 156 
                                        Note: z- statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.The sample means of structural and macroeconomic policy variables 
 
 
Size (log 
GDP) 
Openness 
(%) 
Dependence 
on External 
Financing 
(% change) 
Change in 
Current 
Account 
Deficit* 
Ratio of FDI 
over GDP 
(%) 
Financial 
Development 
(% of GDP) 
Number 
Year with 
Credit 
Boom 
Episodes 
IMF Credit 
and Loans  
(millions 
USD) 
Change in 
CB interest 
Rate 
(p.p)** 
Change in 
Government 
Spending 
(%)** 
Bulgaria 0.78 112.30 67.63 215.26 34.44 34.91 4 -4.04 -2.72 -1.67 
Croatia 4.90 87.42 15.05 1.72 30.71 38.53 3 1.76 -1.50 1.50 
Czech Rep 7.71 125.01 10.25 -70.09 33.71 46.91 2 -69.98 -0.82 0.03 
Estonia 4.62 154.74 57.42 -32.67 56.70 48.78 3 0.25 0.07 2.25 
Hungary 9.50 110.98 19.61 -74.41 66.52 38.21 2 278.07 -1.25 0.59 
Latvia 1.64 98.62 34.77 -169.33 27.30 38.91 2 48.20 -2.36 2.74 
Lithuania 3.92 111.56 45.35 -0.93 21.17 26.69 2 -0.54 -4.68 1.51 
Poland 6.52 58.55 35.00 -87.85 19.96 27.63 0 -7.05 -2.60 1.24 
Romania 4.83 63.86 66.08 5.81 14.05 13.88 1 -10.95 -2.98 0.15 
Slovakia 6.87 141.48 14.81 -51.77 29.77 42.25 2 -34.44 -0.55 -0.43 
Slovenia 2.93 118.43 32.17 31.37 16.00 41.00 1 -0.06 -3.96 3.48 
*Decrease means increase in Current Account Deficit ** Decrease means decrease. 
Source: IMF, OECD, Central Banks Statics, Authors’s Computations  

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Table 5.The Impact of Financial Crises on Output controlling for: Size, Openness and 
External Financing 
Size Openness External Financing 
MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  
Growth(-1) 0.320 
(2.88)* 
0.255 
(2.34)** 
0.531 
(2.72)* 
0.449 
(2.33)** 
0.379 
(4.22)* 
0.296 
(3.62)* 
Growth (-2) -0.128 
(-1.78)*** 
-0.126 
(-1.83)*** 
-0.117 
(-1.63)*** 
-0.118 
(-1.68)*** 
-0.104 
(-1.28) 
-0.114 
(-1.65)*** 
Growth (-3) -0.027 
(-0.47) 
-0.009 
(-0.02) 
-0.024 
(-1.38) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.034 
(-0.45) 
0.038 
(0.57) 
Growth (-4) 0.051 
(-1.23) 
-0.068 
(-1.70)*** 
-0.055 
(-1.38) 
-0.064 
(-1.62)* 
-0.064 
(-1.13) 
-0.047 
(-1.17) 
Crisis -0.046 
(-3.83)*** 
-0.040 
(-3.54)* 
-0.058 
(-0.34) 
-0.029 
(-1.67)* 
-0.011 
(-1.40)* 
-0.006 
(-1.05) 
Crisis (-1) -0.036 
(-5.52)* 
-0.052 
(-6.26)* 
-0.039 
(-5.94)* 
-0.052 
(-6.33)* 
-0.033 
(-4.85)* 
-0.057 
(-7.25)* 
Crisis (-2) -0.013 
(-2.10)** 
-0.025 
(-3.69)* 
-0.017 
(-2.72)* 
-0.026 
(-3.69)* 
-0.003 
(-0.43) 
-0.021 
(-2.59)* 
Crisis (-3) -0.013 
(-2.35)** 
-0.019 
(-1.92)* 
-0.013 
(-2.24)* 
-0.018 
(-2.72)* 
-0.008 
(-1.42) 
-0.012 
(-2.14)** 
Crisis (-4) 0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.012 
(-1.92)** 
-0.0008 
(-0.15) 
-0.012 
(-1.92)** 
0.035 
(0.62) 
-0.0129 
(-2.87)* 
Growth(-1)*X 0.008 
(0.38)* 
0.007 
(0.31) 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
0.267 
(2.45)** 
0.237 
(2.29)** 
Crises*X 0.005 
(2.52)** 
0.005 
(2.48)* 
-0.000 
(-0.94) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
-0.014 
(-1.81)*** 
-0.019 
(-2.87)* 
X -0.04 
(-3.49)* 
-0.031 
(-2.86)* 
0.001 
(4.35)* 
0.00043 
(2.93)* 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
N 156 156 154 154 148 148 
R2 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.70 
Note: t- statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.The Impact of Financial Crises on Output controlling for: Change in Current Account Deficit, 
FDI-to-GDP-ratio, Financial development and credit booms 
Current account 
deficit 
FDI/GDP Financial 
development 
Credit booms 
MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  
Growth(-1) 0.385 
(4.63)* 
0.278 
(3.67)* 
0.368 
(4.09)* 
0.288 
(3.08)* 
0.288 
(2.75)* 
0.232 
(2.34)** 
0.321 
(4.08)* 
0.270 
(3.70)* 
Growth (-2) -0.175 
(-2.22)** 
-0.106 
(-1.53)* 
-0.129 
(-1.72)*** 
-0.129 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.128 
(-1.65)*** 
-0.153 
(-2.06)** 
-0.098 
(-1.30) 
-0.114 
(-1.67)*** 
Growth (-3) 0.015 
(0.26) 
0.133 
(2.06)** 
0.020 
(0.33) 
0.023 
(0.38) 
-0.010 
(-0.17) 
0.067 
(1.02) 
-0.011 
(-0.19) 
0.028 
(0.45) 
Growth (-4) -0.014 
(-0.34) 
-0.115 
(-2.25)** 
-0.052 
(-1.21) 
-0.069 
(-1.55) 
-0.009 
(-0.23) 
-0.068 
(-1.27) 
-0.032 
(-0.81) 
-0.076 
(-1.53)*** 
Crisis -0.018 
(-3.44)* 
-0.018 
(-2.00)** 
-0.034 
(-4.18)* 
-0.020 
(-2.25)** 
-0.010 
(-0.89) 
-0.005 
(-0.41) 
-0.014 
(-2.48)* 
-0.003 
(-0.39) 
Crisis (-1) -0.023 
(-4.29)* 
-0.049 
(-5.82)* 
-0.038 
(-5.45)* 
-0.032 
(-5.23)* 
-0.039 
(-5.63)* 
-0.053 
(-6.13)* 
-0.039 
(-5.83)* 
-0.054 
(-6.66)* 
Crisis (-2) -0.015 
(-2.15)** 
-0.024 
(-3.46)* 
-0.015 
(-2.32)** 
-0.022 
(-2.97)* 
-0.017 
(-2.49)** 
-0.025 
(-3.57)* 
-0.017 
(-2.59)* 
-0.0211 
(-3.08)* 
Crisis (-3) -0.016 
(-2.63)* 
-0.015 
(-2.34)** 
-0.014 
(-2.32)** 
-0.007 
(-2.48)** 
-0.017 
(-2.69)* 
-0.013 
(-2.02)** 
-0.016 
(-2.76)* 
-0.014 
(-2.15)** 
Crisis (-4) -0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.007 
(-1.14) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.011 
(-1.62)* 
0.015 
(0.792) 
-0.010 
(-1.58)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.07) 
-0.009 
(-1.53)*** 
Growth(-1)* X -0.013 
(-1.61)*** 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.003 
(1.49)*** 
0.005 
(2.13)** 
0.137 
(0.86) 
-0.049 
(-0.30) 
Crises*X  -0.002 
(-2.21)** 
-0.005 
(-0.41) 
0.001 
(1.83)*** 
0.005 
(1.81)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.95) 
-0.003 
(-1.50)*** 
-0.029 
(-1.40)*** 
-0.088 
(-3.42)* 
X -0.001 
(-1.90)** 
0.002 
(1.04) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.97) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
N 155 155 153 153 154 154 156 156 
R2 0.53 0.75 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.73 0.61 0.75 
Note: t- statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7.The Impact of Financial Crises on Output controlling for: Exchange rate regime, change in 
government spending, change in monetary policy rates and IMF loan 
Exchange rate regime Change in 
government spending 
Change in policy rate IMF loan 
MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF  MPI  IMF 
Growth(-1) 0.355 
(4.77)* 
0.385 
(4.94)* 
0.360 
(4.51)* 
0.254 
(3.54)* 
0.388 
(4.98)* 
0.357 
(4.34)* 
0.486 
(6.01)* 
0.377 
(4.96)* 
Growth (-2) -0.136 
(-1.83)** 
-0.150 
(-1.93)** 
-0.063 
(-0.83) 
-0.071 
(-1.06) 
-0.175 
(-2.02)** 
-0.185 
(-2.11)** 
-0.151 
(-1.86)*** 
-0.139 
(-1.86)*** 
Growth (-3) 0.019 
(0.33) 
0.018 
(0.29) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
-0.017 
(-0.33) 
0.027 
(0.41) 
0.048 
(0.68) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.048 
(0.71) 
Growth (-4) -0.0141 
(-0.36) 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
-0.063 
(-1.19) 
-0.045 
(-1.23) 
-0.075 
(-1.69)*** 
-0.060 
(-1.26) 
0.011 
(0.25) 
-0.060 
(-1,09) 
Crisis -0.025 
(-4.42)* 
-0.013 
(-1.90)** 
-0.018 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0071 
(-1.34)*** 
-0.039 
(-5.38)* 
-0.014 
(-2.24)** 
-0.017 
(-3.15)* 
-0.024 
(-2.88)* 
Crisis (-1) -0.038 
(-5.69)* 
-0.024 
(-4.15)* 
-0.031 
(-4.75)* 
-0.052 
(-6.58)* 
-0.046 
(-6.17)* 
-0.053 
(-5.33)* 
-0.026 
(-4.41)* 
-0.053 
(-6.05)* 
Crisis (-2) -0.016 
(-2.37)* 
-0.020 
(-2.62)* 
-0.008 
(-1.29) 
-0.021 
(-3.30)* 
-0.019 
(-2.69)* 
-0.021 
(-2.66)* 
-0.013 
(-1.72)*** 
-0.023 
(-3.24)* 
Crisis (-3) -0.016 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.020 
(-2.75)* 
-0.010 
(-1.81)*** 
-0.022 
(-3.60)* 
-0.022 
(-3.58)* 
-0.023 
(-3.16)* 
-0.016 
(-2.50)* 
-1.012 
(-1.87)*** 
Crisis (-4) -0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.012 
(-1.63)*** 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.011 
(-1.91)** 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.015 
(-2.16)** 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.012 
(-1.487)*** 
Growth(-1)* X 0.213 
(1.47)*** 
0.278 
(1.75)*** 
-0.020 
(-1.39)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.52) 
0.007 
(2.10)** 
0.009 
(2.68)* 
0.000 
(-1.41) 
-0.000 
(-1.40) 
Crises*X  0.017 
(1.42)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
0.0026 
(1.12) 
0.005 
(2.81)* 
0.000 
(0.91) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
X -0.017 
(-2.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.83)** 
0.003 
(2.83)* 
0.003 
(3.10)* 
0.000 
(1.20) 
0.001 
(1.68)*** 
0.000 
(1.49) 
0.000 
(0.66) 
N 156 156 145 145 124 124 153 153 
R2 0.62 0.56 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.61 0.57 0.62 
Note: t- statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5% and 10%, respectively. 
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APPENDIX - DATA AND SOURCES 

Output Growth: Ratio between gross government debt and GDP. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics  
 
MPI crisis index: Value equal to 1 corresponds to the real effective exchange rate 
depreciation and loss in FX reserves above “safe threshold”. Source: Andreou et al. (2009) 
 
IMF crisis dummy: Value equal to 1 in correspondence of currency, banking and debt crises. 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
 
Country Size: Calculated as the logarithm of real GDP. Source: IMF International Financial 
Statistics  
 
Trade openness: The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP at constant prices. Source: IMF 
International Financial Statistics  
 
Dependence on External Financing: Calculated as Foreign Liabilities of Domestic Banks 
over GDP and alternatively as Current Account Deficit over GDP. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook 
 
Financial Development: Ratio of Banking Credit to Private Sector over GDP. Source: IMF 
International Financial Statistics  
  
Credit Boom dummy: Value equal to 1 corresponds to “excessive” Banking Credit to Private 
Sector expansion. Source: Zdzienicka (2008) 
 
Exchange Rate Regime dummy: Value equal to 1 corresponds flexible and 0 stands for 
intermediate and fixed exchange rate regime. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Levy –
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and after 2004, the IMF de facto classification   
 
Central Bank Interest Rate: Corresponds to the Central Bank re-financement interest rate. 
Source: Eurostat and Central Banks statistics 
 
Government Spending: Calculates as the ratio of government spending over GDP. Source: 
OECD database (85) 
 
Foreign Aid: Approximated by the IMF credit and loans. Source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
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